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Household survey data indicate that in Israel a woman's educa-
tion increases her husband's  earnings at higher occupational
levels but not at lower ones.
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A recent  focus  on decisionmaking  within  the  Drawing  on data from the Israel  Labor
household  (rather  than  by the individual)  has  Mlobility  Survey,  Neuman  and Ziderman  found
opened  a new field  of research  into  the econom-  that the wife's educational  level increased  a
ics of maniage and the family.  husband's eaniings  in Israel's  primary sector  (in
which workers  have good  jobs, with good pay,
Recent  research  indicates  that in the United  security,  and fringe  benefits)  - but not in the
States,  at least,  a wife's education  has a positive  secondary  sector  (in which  workers  have low-
effect on a husband's  earning  capacity  - a  paying,  unstable,  generally  unattractive  jobs).
focused  instance  of the economic  benefits  of
(particularly  nonmarket)  association. Even  if  These new findings  are consistent  with the
education  did not get women  jobs or improve  general implications  of the dual labor  market
their ability  to function  as housewives  and  model.
mothers,  it is not wasted.
Such  cross-productive  effects  may be
different  in Qe type of dual  labor  market that
exists in Israel.
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along  the lines  pursued  in this  paper  would  be fruitful.Introduction:
In the  quarter  century  following  Becker's  now  classic  presentation
of the  human  capital  model  in terms  of formal  schooling  and training  on-the-
job, the  approach  has  been  extended  with telling  effect  into  numerous
additional  fields  of application  - a tribute  to the  fecundity  of the  original
formulation. One  development  of some  particular  interest  has  been the  focus
on decision  making  within  the  household  unit rather  than  on that  of the
individual,  an approach  that  has  opened  up a new field  of research  into  the
economics  of marriage  and  the  family.'/  Indeed,  adopting  the  wider focus  of
the  household  rather  than  the  individual  decision  maker,  Benham  has  shown  that
for the  U.S.  at least,  wife's  education  has  a positive  effect  on husband's
earnings  capacity. 2/  Putting  on one side  for  the  moment  alternative
explanations  in  terms  of mate  sorting, 3/  Benham's  finding  suggests  that  a
person's  own  labor  market  productivity  (PO)  is affected  not  only  by his own
human  capital  attainments  (Ho)  but also  by those  of this  spouse  (H).
Formally,
P 0 - F  (Ho,  H,)
where  SP,/6H,  >  0.
Thus the  effective  human  capital  stock  of a married  person  is  a positive
function  of the  human  capital  of each  marriage  partner. Benham  sees  these
positive  cross-productivity  effects  of education  within  marriage,  as aparticularly  focussed  form  of the  transfer  of the  benefits  of education  by
(particularly,  non-market)  -ssociat0.on. 4/  He argues  that  these  benefits  may
arise  in at least  three  ways:
(1) by providing  a close  substitute  for  a person's  own  formal
education  by extending  infDrmation  and  advice,
(2)  by helping  the  person  acquire  specific  skills,  and
(3)  by helping  the  person  acquire  general  skills  related  to
information  acquisition  and  assimilation  and  coping  with
change.5/
Marriage  of course  offers  both  greater  opportunities  for  sharing  in
the  pecuniary  benefits  of association  and, therefore,  a larger  incentive  for
doing  so,  than  are  available  in other  forms  of non-market  association.6/
But  are there  particular  labor  market  contexts  in  which  we might
fail  to observe  such  positive  cross-productivity  effects  of wife's  education
on husband's  earnings? That this  may  be the  case is  suggested  by the  results
of a recent  application  of this  approach  to  small  family  businessses. Using
data for  Hong  Kong,  Wong argues  that  cross-productivity  effects  are stronger
within  entrepreneural  families  (when  both spouses  work in the  family  business)
than  for  wage-employed  families. Would  cross  productivity  effects  also  differ
across  broad  occupational  categories? The  purpose  of this  paper  is to probe
some  of these  issues  using israeli  data.
2In an earlier  paper,  the  authors  suggested  that  the  dual labor
market  model  may  be relevant  for  Israel: 7/  while  human  capital  variables  were
shown  to  enhance  male earn:ngs  within  the  designated  primary  labor  market,
they  failed  to  do so in the  secondary  sector. In  a similar  vein,  and
following  Benham,  wife's  education  would  be expected  to exert  a  positive
influence  on husband's  earnings  in  primary  labor  markets. However,  for
secondary  labor  markets,  where  own  human  capital  attributes  generally  do not
result  in enhanced  earnings,  it  might  be surmised  that  husband's  earnings
would  not  show  any  relationship  to  wife's  educational  level. To test  this
proposition,  we returned  to the  original  data  set  used in the  previous  paper;
the  male sample  was, as before,  decomposed  into  primary  and secoodary  labor
market  sectors. Employing  a method  used  by McNabb  and  Psacharopoulos 8/, the
allocation  to  market  sector  was  based  on occupational  prestige  scores,  workers
in low  prestege  occupations  (ccomr.ising  some  29  per cent  of the  sample)  being
assigned  to the  secondary  laboi  market  sector. 9/
Earnings  functions  of the  Mincer  type  were  estimated  for  both
primary  and  secondary  labor  markets  using  a specification  that  included
variables  relating  to spouse's  education  and  to the  number  of years  marr.ed.
Our  results  (reported  below)  while  supporting  the  noti3n  of a positive  cross-
productivity  effect  of  wife's  education  on  husband's  earnings  in the  primary
sector,  found  no such effect  for  the  secondary  sector. Some  readers  may  be
sceptical  about  the  validity  of the  dual  labor  market  model,  which  remains  the
subject  of some  controversy  in the  literature.  Even  so,  it is  hoped  that  our
findings,  showing  that  wife's  human  capital  augments  husband's  earnings  in
some  occupational  categories  (of  higher  prestege)  but  not in  others  (with  low
3status),  will  be of interest  also  to those  who do not share  the  authors'  dual
labor  market  interpretation  of the  results.
Data:
The  data used in this  study  are  drawn  from  the  1974  Israel  Labor
Mobility  Survey,  conducted  by the  Central  Bureau  of Statistics  and relate  to
married  full-time  working  males. We estimated  a series  of earnings  functions
for the  primary  and  secondary  labor  matket  sectors  respectively,  in  which  the
log  of individual  annual  earnings  for  full-time  male  married  workers  (with
wife present)  is run  against  three  sets  of explanatory  variables,  the  first
two  of which  were included  in  the  regression  model  specified  in the  earlier
paper:
(a)  traditional  human  capital  related  variables: years  of
schooling  (SCH),  years  of labor  market  experience  (EXP,  defined
as age-SCH-6),  EXP 2, an interaction  variable  EXP.SCH  and
number  of years  employed  at present  place  of  work (PRESWK).
(b)  control  variables:  years  of residence  in Israel  (RESID),  weeks
worked  in the  past  year (WEEKS),  hours  worked  per  week (HOURS),
a dummy  variable  relating  to ethnic  origin  (ETHNIC,  Oriental  -
1,  Western  - 0) and  a series  of dummy  variables  for  economic
sector.1°/
4(c)  characteristics  of  marriage  variables:  variables  were added,  in
alternp'.ive  regression specifications,  relating  to duration  of
marriage,  wife's  schooling  and  various  interaction  terms  that
included  these  variables. The  variables  used in the  regression
runs  reported  in  the  tables  are:  years  of marriage  (MARR),  a
dummy  variable  relating  to  wife's  level  of schooling  (WSCH-1  if
wife had  at least  completed  final  grade  at high  school  and  -O
if otherwise),  and interaction  terms  WSCH.MARR  and  SCH.MARR.
The  hypothesis  to  be tested  is that  cross-productivity  effects  of
wide's  education  will  be evident  in  primary  labor  market  but  absent  in
secondary  markets. Just  as own  human  capital  investments  remain  generally
unrewarded  in secondary  labor  markets,  so spouse's  human  capital  stock  will
not contribute  to own  earnings,  via the  cross-productivity  processes  of
association,  as outlined  above.
Main Findings:
Our central  results  are  presented  in  Table  1,  which  confirm  that  the
traditional  human  capital  variables  for  the  worker  are  positive  and
significant  (except  for  EXP.SCH)  in  primary  labor  markets,  while  the
coefficients  relating  to own  human  capital  are  all  non-significant  for the
secondary  sector,  as predicted  by the  dual labor  market  model.  However  our
focus  is on the  group  C  variables.
5In regression  model (1)  the  two  var'ables  relating  to wife's  level
of schooling  and  duration  of marriage  respectively are  of interest  for
testing  the  cross  productivity  model. While  MARR is insignificant  in  both the
primary  and  secondary  sectors,  WSCH is  positive  and  highly  significant  in the
primary  sector,  though  not  significant  in the  secondary. A well educated
wife,  who  has at least  completed  high school,  raises  her  husbands  productivity
(and  earnings)  by about  Q percent  if  he works in  tne  primary  sector,  but does
not enhance  earnings  if  he is confined  to the  secondary  sector. 1"/  These
results  are  highly  confirmatory  of Benham's  for  the  U.S.  labor  market  as a
whole.
However,  Benham's  findings  have  been treated  by some  commentators
with caution,  arguing  that  they  are  equivocal,  being  consistent  also  with an
explanation  in terms  of  mate sorting.12/  In the  latter  viewpoint,  more able
persons  (thus  having  higher  earnings)  seek  out  and  tend to  marry  women  with
desirable  traits,  such  as  high education  - thus  any  measured  correlation
between  wife's  education  and  husband's  earnings  may  be statistical  only  rather
than  causative,  the  line  of causation  running  through  husband's  ability  rather
than  directly  between  wife's  education  and  husband's  earnings. This criticism
might  be relevant  in  the  present  case  too.
It  could  be argued  that  a good  education  is regarded  as a desirable
trait  in a wife in  primary  labor  markets  where  workers  are  more educated  on
average  (10.4  mean  years  schooling)  but not in secondary  markets  where  worker
educational  attainments  are  typically  lower  (7.2  years  of schooling,  on
average). 13/  A less  well educated  worker,  even though  he is able,  might  feel
6threatened  by a  wife  better  educated  than  himself. Thus,  the  process  of  mate
sortirng  described  above  might  take  place  in primary  labor  markets  but  not
secondary  ones.  The statistical  correlation  between  wife's  education  and  own
ability  which  might  explain  the  statistical  significarce  of  wife's  schooling
on earnings,  would  be at work in  primary  labor  markets  only.  This, in  turn,
could  account  for the  differences  in the  results  between  primary  and  secondary
sectors  for  regression  model  (2)  as well  as tnose  reported  in footnote  11.
We attempt  to  deal  with the  issue  of sorting  by adding  two
interaction  variables,  WSCH.MARR  and  SCH.MARR,  to  the  earnings  function.  These
results  (regression  model (2))  constitute  the  central  findings  of this  paper.
While  both  wife's  schooling  and  duration  of marriage  do not,  alone,  have  a
significant  effect  on  husband's  earnings  in either  sector,  the  interaction
term  WSCH.MARR  is positive  and  highly  significant  for  primary  sector  workers,
but  not for  secondary  sector  workers. 1 4/  This  suggests  that  the  schooling  of a
well  educated  wife exerts  a  positive  influence  on husband's  earnings,  which
increases  with  years  of marriage. 15/  While  this  is a plausible  result  for the
cross-productivity  model,  it is  not  predicted  by the  mate  sorting  approach.
Finally,  given  the  high  correlation  between  spouses'  education,  an interaction
term  of MARR  with  own schooling  was included  (SCH.MARR),  to  avoid  biassing  the
WSCH.MARR  coefficient.
In  sum, the  lack  of significance  on the  WSCH  variable  alone,  and
more  particularly  the  positive  coefficient  on the interaction  of  WSCH and
duration  of  marriage  in  the  primary  sector  tells  against  an  explanation  in
terms  of  mate sorting.  These  results  may  be seen  as a confirmation  of the
7presence  of a positive  cross-productivity  effect  of wife's  education  on
husband's  earnings  when the latter  is  attached  to the  primary  labor  market
sector. In contrast,  regression  model (2)  results  relating  to secondary  labor
markets  are  highly  compatible  with the  type  of outcomes  that  would  be expected
in  secondary  labor  markets. The own  human  capital  variables  are  all  non
significant,  as is the  WSCH.MARR  interaction  term,  indicating  that,  unlike  in
the  primary  labor  sector  case,  wife's  human  capital  does  not  contribute  to
husband's  labor  market  effectiveness. 16/
Selectivity  bias and  other  statistical  issues:
Our central  findings  were presented  in the  preceding  section. In
the  present  section  we offer  further  tests  of the  robustness  of our  main,
regression  model (2)  results. 1 7/  First  we take  account  of the  possibility  that
the  estimates  for  regression  model (2)  may  be affected  by selectivity  bias
(even  though  in the  dual labor  model  there  are  constraints  on the  freedom  of
the  worker  to choose  which  market  sector  to  join).  It is  possible  that  the
random  component  of the  earnings  function  is  correlated  with the  sectoral
choice  equation. If this  were the  case,  any  direct  estimation  of the  earnings
functions,  without  including  the  conditional  mean  of the  error  as an
explanatory  variable,  would  result  in  biased  estimates. We attempted  to
correct  our  sector-specific  earnings  equations  for  selection  bias  using  the
two-stage  estimation  procedure  suggested  by Heckman. 18/
We first  estimated  a logit  function  determining  the  choice  between
primary  and  secondary  sectors  based  on own schooling,  wife's  schooling,  age
8and  years  of residence  in Israel. Then,  the  estimated  parameters  of the  logit
function  were used  to construct  a correction  factor,  lambda  (the  inverse  of
Mill's  ratio),  which  was  entered  as a regressor  in  the  earnings  functions
which  were  now reestimated.
The coefficients  of the  correction  factors  (lambda)  in  both the
primary  and the  secondary  sectors  were insignificant  (t-1.22  for  the  primary
and t-O.Ol  for  the  secondary  sector)  which  means  that  there  is no self
selection  to labor  market  sector, The  use  of separate  sector-specific
functions  is  justified. 1 9/
Finally,  we consider  the  possibility  that  the  variable  measuring
ntuber  of  weeks  worked  (WEEKS)  may  not  be exogenouis:  workers  with  high  wage
rates  may tend  to  work  more  weeks  in the  year.  Si.nce  the  dependent  variable
is  ^EA1  earnings  it seemed  appropriate  to add  WEEKS  as an explanatory
variable;  however,  including  WEEKS  in the  regression  models,  without  taking
account  of its  possible  endogeneity,  may  create  some  perverse  effects  on other
variables. One  way of  dealing  with this  statistical  problem  is to adopt  a two
stage  least  squares  approach,  treating  both  annual  earnings  and  WEEKS  as
endogenous  variables. The  results,  based  on regression  model (2)  are
presented  in  Table  2,  as regressions  (3).
Compared  with  regression  model  (2)  results,  the  difierences  are
minor.  The  main change  is in the  WEEKS  variable:  previously  positive  and
highly  significant  in  both sectors,  it  now loses  its  significance  in the
secondary  sector  (indicating  that  it is endogenous  in that  sector)  and  is
9larger,  though  of lower  significance,  in the  primary  sector. However,  no
major  change  is  effected  in the  coefficients  on the  WSCH.MARR  variable,  which
remains  significant  in the  primary  sector  only,  the  rate  of return  rising  from
0.88  percent  for  each  year  of marriage  to 1.13  percent.>/
Discussion:
It is  now  well accepted  in the  human  capital  literature  that  the
benefits  stemming  from  educational  investment  extend  beyond  those  directly
emanating  from  erhanced  wages. Thus,  even for  educated  married  women  not
attached  to the  labor  market,  benefits  from  education  will show themselves  in
terms  of greater  efficiency  in  housework  and  running  the  home and in the
quality  of child  care  and  rearing. Measured  private  rates  of return  to  female
educational  investment  that  tailed  to take  account  of these  benefits  within
the  household  context,  would  understate  true  rates  of return. Benham  has
argued  that  there  are likely  to  be additional  labor  market  benefits  of female
education  through  an augmentation  of husband's  earnings  - a  highly  focussed
instance  of the  economic  benefits  stemming  from  association.
In the  present  paper  we have suggested  that  such  cross-productivity
effects  may  not  be forthcoming  in all  labor  market  contexts;  for  some
occupational  groupings  these  effects  may  be strong,  for  others  weak  or absent.
This  was found  to  be the  case in  Israel  for  occupational  groupings,  relating
to  higher  and  low  status  occupations;  cross  productivity  effects  were positive
for  the  former  group  but  not significant  for  the latter. We interpret  these
10two  groups  as corresponding  to  workers  attached  to  primary  and secondary  labor
markets,  respectively.
In such  a situation  where  the  labor  market  is  characterized  by
duality,  wife's  human  capital  stock  as well  as that  of the  husband  can  be seen
as augmenting  the  latter's  earnings  in the  primary  sector  (a  finding  in line
with Benham's  results  for  the  U.S.);  however,  for  husbands  attached  to the
secondary  sector  neither  husband's  nor  wife's  human  capital  have  any
significant  effect  in  raising  husband's  earnings. These  results  attest  to the
presence  of positive  cross-productivity  effects  of wife's  education  on
husbands  earnings  in the  primary,  but  not in the  secondary,  labor  market
sector,  a finding  that  is  consistent  with the  general  implications  of the  dual
labor  market  model.
The  question  now arises  whether,  for  families  where  the  husband  is
attached  to the  secondary  sector,  the  household  benefits  of wife's  education,
too,  are  zero (or  at least  significantly  lower  than  in the  primary  sector),  as
is the  case for  labor  market  benefits  (resulting  either  from  husband's  higher
productivity  or form  the  cross-productivity  effects  of wife's  education).
Such  a possibility  may go some  way towards  offering  a partial
explanation  for  one  of the  dominant  characteristics  of the  dual labor  market
model - the  extremely  low inter-sector  mobility  between  primary  and secondary
sectors,  and the  consequent  durability  of the  latter  sector. Why is
attachment  to the  secondary  labor  market  sector  so  strong,  given  the  clear
benefits  available  from  moving  to  the  primary  sector? Evidently,  this
11obduracy  is the  result  of  negative,  intergenerational,  behavioral  traits  and
ingrained  attitudes  towards  the  world  of  work (reinforced  by the  type  of
employment  offered  by,  and low  expectations  of,  secondary  sector  employers).
Traditionally,  economists  have looked  to educational  investments  as a  means  of
dealing  with the  problem  of the low  paid  and  the  cycle  of poverty,  not only
through  raising  potential  productivity  and  wages,  but also,  over the  longer
term,  by changing  individual  attitudes,  expectations  and  motivations.  Dual
labor  market  theorists  on the  other  hard  claim  that  educational  investments
will  be ineffective  in  leading  to  higher  wages  for  those  attached  to secondary
labor  markets;  it is  also  possible  that  these  longer  term,  attitudinal  effects
of education,  too,  will  be circumvented,  if  women  who  have received  additional
education  are  unable  as wives  and  mothers  to transmit  improved  attitudes  or
values  to other  members  of the  household,  particularly  the  younger  ones.  In
such  situations,  these  low  household  benefits  of wife's  education  would
constitute  a factor,  on the  supply  side,  accounting  for  the  durability  of
secondary  labor  markets.
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method  used.
10.  The economic  sectors  are:  Industry  (mining  and ianufacturing)  -
IND;  Electricity  and  water  - ELECT;  Construction  (building  and
public works) - CONSTR: Commerce, restaurants and hotels - COMM;
Transport,  storage  and  communications  - TRANS;  Financing  and
13business services - FINANCE; Personal and other services - PRIVATE.
Agriculture,  forestry  and  fishing  is included  in the  constant  term.
Public  services  sector  was not included  in this  analysis:  see  Neuman
and  Ziderman  p.232.
11.  Two other  specifications  of wife's  education  which  were tried
yielded  similar  results:  the  variables  representing  wife's  education
were significant  only  in the  primary  sector,  in  both  cases.  First,
wife's  education  was entered  as a continuous  variable,  measured  by
years  of schooling;  the  coefficient  was  0.0220  (t-3.38),  indicating
that  each  additional  year  of wife's  schooling  enhances  husbands
earnings  (in  the  primary  sector)  by over  2 per  cent  annually.
Alternatively,  two  dummy  variables  for  wife  with  9-11  years  and at
least  12 years  of schooling,  respectively,  were  used (with  0-8  years
of schooling  as the  reference  group).  The  coefficients  were,  in
turn,  0.0873  (t=l  19)  and  0.1540  (t=2.90).
12.  See  Becker  and  also  Finis  Welch,  "Comment,"  Journal  of Political
Economy  (March-April  1974).
13.  The  standard  deviations  are  similar:  3.7  and  3.8.  The  wives  of
primary  sector  workers,  too,  are  more  educated  - a mean  of 9.8  years
(standard  deviation  3.7),  compared  with  6.2 (3.9)  for  wives  of
secondary  sector  workers. The  correlation  coefficient  between
spouses'  education  attainment  is  higher  in  the  primary  sector
(0.673)  than  the  secondary  (0.516).
14.  To confirm  that  there  is  a significant  difference  between  the
WSCH.MARR  term  for  the  two  segments,  an earnings  equation  similar  to
regression  model  (2)  was  run  jointly  for  the  entire  sample. A dummy
variable  PRIM  was  added  (=1  if  worker  is  attached  to  the  primary
sector),  as well  as interaction  terms  of PRIM  with  each  of the
worker's  (own)  human  capital  variables  as well  as with  the
characteristics  of marriage  variables.  The  coefficient  on the
variable  PRIM.WSCH.MARR  is positive  (b=0.0058)  and  significant,  at
the  10 per  cent  level. Following  the  suggestion  of an anonymous
referee,  the  composite  regression  was rerun  without  the  full  range
of interactions  between  PRIM  and  husband's  own  characteristics
leaving  interactions  with the  characteristics  of marriage  variables
only.  The  effect  is to increase  both the  size  of the  PRIM.WSCH.MARR
coefficient  and its  level  of significance  (b-0.0073,  t=l.99).
15.  Regression  model (2)  was estimated  with  the  alternative
specifications  of  wife's  schooling,  given  in note  10.  Insignificant
coefficients  on the  interaction  term  of  wife's  schooling  and
marriage  duration  were found  for  both the  continuous  WSCH  variable
case and  for  the  middle  level  schooling  interaction  dummy  (9-11
years  schooling  and  MARR),  suggesting  that  it is only  when  wives  are
fairly  well educated  that  they  are  able  to exert  a positive  cross
productivity  effect  in raising  husbands'  income.
1416.  Supportive  findings  were produced  from  largely  duplicated  regression
runs  using  data  drawn  from  the 1983  Israel  Census  of Population,  a
source  that  was as  yet unavailable  at the  time  the  original  research
reported  in Neuman  and  Ziderman  was  undertaken. Thus,  on the  basis
of a much  more comprehensive  data  set (with  7703  and  2491
observations  in the  primary  and  secondary  sectors,  respectively),
but lacking  the  important  PRESWK  variable,  these  regressions  offered
further  support  for  the  existence  of dual  labor  markets  in Israel.
The  human  capital  variables  performed  as  predicted  in  each  of the
sectors,  including  those  testing  the  cross-productivity  effects  of
wife's  education. These  regression  results  based  on the  Census  of
Population  are  available  from  the  authors,  on request.
17.  This  section  owes  much to the  helpful  suggestions  of an anonymous
referee.
18.  James  J. Heckman,  "The  Common  Structure  of Models  of Truncation,
Sample  Selection  and  Limited  Dependent  Variables  and a Simple
Estimator  for  Such  Models",  Annals  of Economic  and Social
Measurement,  (5,  1976),  and  James  J. Heckman,  "Sample  Selection  Bias
as a Specification  Error",  Econometrica  (47,  1979). For an
application  of this  approach  to  dual labor  markets,  see  James  J.
Heckman  and  Joseph  V. Hotz,  "The  Sources  of Inequality  in Panama's
Labor  Market",  Journal  of Human  Resources,  (21,  1986).
19.  These  results  are  obtainable  from  the  authors,  on request.
20.  We also tried  adding  the  selectivity  correction  factor  lambda  to
this  2SLS  regression.  Again,  lambda  was insignificant  in  both
sectors.
15Earrdxgs  Rmttom  ((IS):  Prigy  and Secxmdy  Ii-or  Maiets
(0ependrit Variable: IDg Annal  hale Farns)
ItRegression  Mbdel  (1)  Regression  Model  (2)
Variables  Primary  Sector  Secondary  Sector  Primary  Sector  SeconDary  Sector




SCH  0.0420  3.03  -0.0223  -0.90  0.0513  3.54  -0.0177  -0.69
EXP  0.0183  1.78  -0.CCD13  -0.08  0.0134  1.19  0.0018  0.11
EXP 2 -0.0003  -2.66  -0.0002  -0.97  -0.0003  -2.53  -0.0002  -0.95
EXP.SCH -0.0004  -1.08  0.0007  1.08  -0.0001  -0.16  0.0003  0.35
PRESWK  0.0119 5.03  0.0025  0.71  0.0123 5.20  0.0026  0.76
Co) Control
variables
RESID  0.0030  1.83  0.0080  3.16  0.0030 1.82  0.0081  3.17
WEEKS  0.0323  12.26  0.0361  10.04  0.0327  12.45  0.0363  10.02
HOLRS  0.0093  3.54  0.0031  0.67  0.0092 3.51  0.0028  0.60
EIHNIC  -0.0920  -2.41  -0.1178  -2.25  -0.0984  -2.58  -0.1168  -2.22
Economic Sector:
IND  0.1745  1.17  0.2865  3.07  0.2202  1.46  0.2809  3.00
ELEC  0.1773  1.00  *  *  0.2174  0.43  *  *
aCS1R  0.1339  0.86  0.2850  2.64  0.1884 1.20  0.2783  2.57
folM  0.0455 0.29  0.1796  1.61  0.0938 0.59  0.1836  1.63
IRANS  0.0902 0.58  0.2483  2.02  0.1439 0.93  0.2351  1.89
FINANCE  0.1824 1.17  *  *  0.2364 1.50  *  *




WSCH  0.0857 2.03  0.0267  0.27  -0.0528  -0.69  -0.0507 -0.30
MARR  0.0007 0.22  -0.0001  -0.29  0.0089 1.10  -0.0055 -0.79
WSCH.MARR  - - - - 0.0088  2.15  0.0044  0.59
SCH.MARR  - - - - -0.0011  -1.38  0.0005  0.63
CCNS'ANr  6.8690  23.39  7.3888  17.78  6.7785  22.95  7.3659 17.54
R2  0.4568  0.4764  0.4629  0.4795
n  488  198  488  198
Notes:
b:  Coefficient  t:  t-statistic
The following  variables  are  inrxluded  in  the  constant  term:
Ethnic  origin:  westem
Economic sector:  agriculture
Wife's  education:  less  than  12 years  of  scdhoolirg
*  No observations  in  these  categories.Table  2
Earnings  Functions  (2SLS):  Primary  and  Secondary  Labor  Markets
(Dependent  Variable:  Log  Annual  Male  Earnings)
Independent  Regression (3)__
Variables  Primary Sector  Secondary Sector




SCH  0.0465  2.83  -0.0088  -0.30
EXP  0.0036  0.22  0.0120  0.59
EXp2  -0.0002  -1.24  -0.0003  -1.24
EXP.SCH  0.0002  0.31  -0.00007  -0.08
PRESWK  0.0108  3.49  0.0049  1.13
(b) Control
variables
RESID  0.0036  1.90  0.0076  2.68
WEEKS  0.0547  2.18  0.0148  0.72
HOURS  0.0083  2.78  0.0032  0.63
ETHNIC  -0.0885  -2.09  -0.1245  -2.15
Economic Sector:
IND  0.2425  1.48  0.2611  2.50
ELEC  0.2774  1.37  *  *
CONSTR  0.2567  1.38  0.2170  1.65
COMM  0.1077  0.63  0.1625  1.30
TRANS  0.1827  1.06  0.1292  0.77
FINANCE  0.2430  1.44  *  *




WSCH  -0.1078  -1.04  0,0145  0.07
MARR  0.0103  1.17  -0.0071  -0.91
WSCH.MARR  0.0113  2.17  0.0003  0.04
SCH.MARR  -0.0014  -1.54  0.0006  0.74
CONSTANT  5.8545  5.34  8.2728  8.64
R2  0.3199  0.2330
n  488  198
Notes:
b: Coefficient  t: t-statistic
The following variables are included in the constant term:
Ethnic origin:  western
Economic sector:  agriculture
Wife's education:  less than 12 years of
schooling
*  No observations in these categories.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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